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“ICE” CAPADES: RESTITUTION ORDERS
AND THE FCPA
Shane Frick*
INTRODUCTION
The notion that victims should obtain compensation for their
losses evokes basic principles of fairness. In Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (“FCPA”) litigation, however, the all too common theme is that vic-
tims never receive compensation. In light of the massive efforts now
underway to enforce the FCPA,1 this precedent cannot continue.
For much of its history the FCPA was inconsequential to the
legal landscape.2 Within the last decade that notion has changed dra-
matically.3 Enforcement of the FCPA has led to settlements, fines, and
disgorgements totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.4 Looming on
the FCPA enforcement horizon is the Wal-Mart investigation.5 The
scope and scale of Wal-Mart’s potential violations could set FCPA en-
forcement records and will almost certainly become the preeminent
FCPA enforcement case of its time.6 The potential for liability is com-
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Richmond School of Law, B.S. 2010, The
Pennsylvania State University. Thank you to executive board and staff of the
Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business for his hard work, support, and
assistance. Further thanks to Professor Andrew Spalding for your help throughout
the writing process.
1 Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 784 (2011).
2 Dionne Searcey, U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes, WALL ST. J. (May 26,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124329477230952689.html.
3 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Dec-
ade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2009); Jordan Maglich, Under the FCPA,
Where Are Victim’s Rights?, FCPA BLOG (May 25, 2011, 6:42 AM), http://www.
fcpablog.com/blog/2011/5/25/under-the-fcpa-where-are-victims-rights.html.
4 Richard L. Cassin, Pfizer Joins Our Top Ten Disgorgement List, FCPA BLOG
(Aug. 8, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/8/pfizer-joins-our-
top-ten-disgorgement-list.html; Richard L. Cassin, With Magyar In New Top Ten,
It’s 90% Non-U.S., FCPA BLOG (Dec. 29, 2011, 1:28 PM),   http://www.fcpablog.
com/blog/2011/12/29/with-magyar-in-new-top-ten-its-90-non-us.html.
5 David Barstow, Vast Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?page
wanted=all.
6 Mike Scher, Wal-Mart Will Test FCPA Enforcement in New Ways, FCPA BLOG
(Dec. 19, 2012, 4:10 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/12/19/wal-mart-will-
test-fcpa-enforcement-in-new-ways.html; Andy Spalding, Wal-Mart’s Expanding
433
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parable to the British Petroleum (“BP”) Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
with one commentator calling Wal-Mart the “BP of anti-bribery
enforcement.”7
Whatever similarities may exist between the Department of
Justice’s case against BP and the pending case against Wal-Mart, the
similarities are likely to end when the discussion turns to victim com-
pensation. When the BP prosecution ended, $2.4 billion went directly
to construction and environmental reconstruction efforts.8 However,
assuming Wal-Mart is liable, it is unlikely that its victims will receive
compensation in any fashion.
In FCPA enforcement, regardless of how a case concludes, very
little if any money will see its way back to victims of the bribery.9 This
marginalization or, perhaps more accurately, near complete ignorance
of victim’s rights has led several FCPA commentators to decry the ap-
parent injustice.10 With the potential for the largest settlement ever
for an FCPA enforcement action in the near future, this injustice to the
victims looms ever larger.
This comment discusses federal restitution orders and why
they are not a viable source of compensation for FCPA victims. Section
I provides background information on the FCPA and outlines how it is
enforced. Section II discusses victims’ rights under a series of pieces of
federal legislation. Section III looks at the primary precedent in the
arena and explains why it shows that the restitution statutes do not
provide sufficient FCPA victim restitution. Section IV discusses the
pending Wal-Mart case and the issues facing Wal-Mart victims. Sec-
tion V outlines other avenues of recovery for FCPA victims and pro-
poses new measures for compensating victims.
Investigation Reveals FCPA as Trade Policy, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 15, 2012, 2:28 PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/15/wal-marts-expanding-investigation-rev
eals-fcpa-as-trade-poli.html.
7 Andy Spalding, If the DOJ is Compensating BP’s Victims, Couldn’t it Compen-
sate Wal-Mart’s?, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 26, 2012, 6:13 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2012/11/26/if-the-doj-is-compensating-bps-victims-couldnt-it-compensate.
html.
8 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BP Exploration and Product Inc. Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of
Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-1369.html.
9 Maglich, supra note 3; Spalding, supra note 7.
10 Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419 (2012); Mike
Koehler, Where Should the Money Go?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 26, 2012), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/where-should-the-money-go; Spalding, supra note 7.
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I. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE FCPA
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in
the wake of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) investiga-
tions that showed rampant bribing of foreign government officials11 by
United States companies.12 The FCPA itself outlaws bribing foreign
officials in pursuit of business objectives with a corrupt intent.13 In
1998, amendments to the FCPA extended its jurisdictional reach to
include foreign companies and nationals who act to further a corrupt
payment within United States territory.14 Indeed, the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA are far reaching and led the Fifth Circuit to
conclude that Congress intended the FCPA to “cast [a] . . . wide net
over foreign bribery.”15
The SEC and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) handle enforce-
ment of the FCPA.16  There are essentially three categories of individ-
uals subject to these entities’ jurisdiction: domestic concerns,17 foreign
companies and nationals who act in furtherance of an FCPA violation
while in U.S. territory, and “issuers.”18 The DOJ is tasked with crimi-
nal enforcement against all three categories and civil enforcement
against domestic concerns and foreign companies and nationals.19 The
SEC handles civil enforcement against issuers.20
When an individual or entity is criminally liable under the
FCPA, a variety of penalties can result. Pursuant to the Alternative
Fines Act, penalties can reach up to two times the “benefit that the
defendant sought to obtain by making the corrupt payment.”21 The
question of where this money goes brings a simple answer: straight
into the United States Treasury.22 With a handful of rare exceptions,23
11 Maglich, supra note 3.
12 A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
3, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2013)
[hereinafter FCPA Guide].
13 Id. at 14.
14 Id. at 11-12.
15 U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2004).
16 FCPA Guide, supra note 12, at 4-5.
17 Domestic concerns are citizens, residents, and any business entity organized
under U.S. law whose principle place of business is in the U.S. Id. at 2
18 Issuers are corporations registered in the U.S. or corporations required to file
certain SEC reports. Id. at 3.
19 Id. at 2.
20 Id. at 3.
21 Id. at 6.
22 FCPA Fines: Where Does All the Money Go?, TRACE BLOG (Feb. 13, 2009), http:/
/traceblog.org/2009/02/13/fcpa-fines-where-does-all-the-money-go [hereinafter
FCPA Fines]; Maglich, supra note 3; Mike Koehler, ICE Appeal Receives Chilly
Reception at 11th Circuit, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 20, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.
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this has been the result of the vast majority of FCPA enforcement ac-
tions.24 The question of why is a bit trickier.
The FCPA legislation itself remains largely silent on the is-
sue.25 The single reference to the Treasury in the text of the statute
states that issuers who fail to file required information, documents, or
reports are subject to a penalty of $100 each day payable to the Trea-
sury.26 With the remainder of the statute seemingly silent, history
proves to be the best tool for further insight into the topic, though the
matter is further complicated because FCPA cases are rarely
litigated.27
The majority of potential FCPA violation cases never see the
inside of a courtroom.28 As a direct result of litigation costs29 and the
seemingly high probability of a guilty verdict,30 corporations typically
resolve criminal FCPA issues through “deferred-prosecution agree-
ments,” “non-prosecution agreements,” or plea agreements.31 An addi-
tional possible outcome is a declination,32 a decision to not prosecute
the individual or entity after an investigation.33 Prosecutors base the
decision to prosecute or to decline to prosecute on the Principles of Fed-
eral Prosecution, and a declination can occur for any number of rea-
blogspot.com/2011/06/ice-appeal-receives-chilly-reception-at.html; Thomas O.
Gorman, An FCPA Motion That May Alter Settlement Procedures, SEC ACTIONS
(May 6, 2011), http://www.secactions.com/?p=326.
23 See U.S. v. Diaz, No. 09-cr-20346-JEM (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/diazj.html; U.S. v. F.G. Mason
Eng’g, No. B-90-29 (D. Conn. 1990), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/fg-mason.html; U.S. v. Kenny Int’l Corp., No. 79-372 (D. D.C.
1979), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kenny-inter
national.html.
24 FCPA Fines, supra note 22.
25 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq., available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/statutes/regulations.html.
26 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(b).
27 Mike Koehler, Has the FCPA Been Amended Since 1977?, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#q2 [hereinafter Koehler
1977]; Mike Koehler, The Manhattan Institute Joins the FCPA Reform Conversa-
tion, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-manhat
tan-institute-joins-the-fcpa-reform-conversation [hereinafter Koehler Manhattan].
28 Koehler 1977, supra note 27; see also Koehler Manhattan, supra note 27.
29 Koehler Manhattan, supra note 27.
30 Mark, supra note 10, at 454-56.
31 Mike Koehler, How Are FCPA Enforcement Actions Typically Resolved?, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#q16; see also
Koehler, supra note 27.
32 FCPA Guide, supra note 12, at 75.
33 Id.
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sons.34 While the raw number of declinations is not exceedingly high
(combined known declinations by the SEC and DOJ between 2008 and
2012 was around 7),35 they have involved high profile business
entities.36
II. VICTIM’S RIGHTS TO RESTITUTION
The question of how FCPA criminal enforcement money can be
dispersed to victims implicates several pieces of legislation. This com-
ment will focus on the major criminal statutory provisions, namely:
the Victims of Crime Act, Victim Witness Protection Act, Mandatory
Victim Restitution Act, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act.37 While
these pieces of legislation contain laudable aims, they fail to address
FCPA victims’ needs in almost every conceivable scenario.  The causes
for this failure are varied, but the conclusion is singular: change is
needed.
A. Victims of Crime Act
The Victims of Crime Act (“VOCA”) established the Treasury’s
Crime Victims Fund, which is the primary repository for money that
victims of FCPA actions may receive.38 The U.S. Treasury oversees the
fund, and the government deposits all fines for offenses against the
United States into this fund.39 Besides criminal fines, the deposits
come from forfeited bonds, special assessments, and various other
sources.40 The fund itself receives staggering deposits with $2.362 bil-
lion deposited in the year 2010 alone.41 The government uses the
money available for distribution in a variety of ways, including: federal
and state victim assistance programs, victim compensation, and dis-
cretionary grants (to support the training of victim service providers
and affiliated professionals).42 VOCA, however, fails to address the
needs of FCPA victims.
34 Id.
35 Richard L. Cassin, 2012: The Year in Declinations, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 27, 2012,
4:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/12/27/2012-the-year-in-declinations.
html.
36 Namely Morgan Stanley and Academi LLC (formally known as Blackwater
Worldwide). Id.
37 The Crime Victims’ Rights Act was part of the Justice for All Act of 2004. PUB.
L. NO. 108-405, 118 Stat 2260.
38 42 U.S.C. § 10601, et seq.
39 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b)(1).
40 Crime Victims Fund, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
ovc/pubs/crimevictimsfundfs/intro.html#figure1 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
41 Id.
42 Id.
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The federal government does disperse money to state govern-
ments for victims of crime pursuant to VOCA, but in a limited way.
The compensations occurs through grants and these grants are only
available to victims of violent crimes.43 This effectively excludes non-
violent crime victims like victims of FCPA violations. While money is
also available for victim assistance programs whose potential use
could be for victims of any type of crime, FCPA victims do not receive
such assistance. Compounding these technical difficulties is the persis-
tent issue of convincing state governments to pay (typically) foreign
victims of the violation of a federal crime. The federal government al-
most certainly would implement a more effective program, as they are
the party enforcing the law and controlling the funds. This efficiency
can be seen in the Federal Victim Notification System.
VOCA provides money from the Crime Victims Fund for the
Federal Victim Notification System and to pay for victim-witness coor-
dinators in all U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.44 In conjunction, these two enti-
ties notify and inform victims about possible restitution.45 Increased
use of money in this fashion could help identify victims of FCPA viola-
tions and inform them of their rights. This identification and notifica-
tion would allow FCPA victims to exercise their statutory victims’
rights and would allow courts to order restitution under the Victim
and Witness Protection Act or Mandatory Victim Restitution Act. For
reasons discussed below, this identification and notification does not
occur. Accordingly, the money VOCA sets aside from the Crime Vic-
tims Fund does not assist FCPA victims through federal action either.
B. Crime Victims’ Rights Act
Passed in 2004, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) cre-
ated a “bill of rights” of sorts for victims of crime.46 Of note, the CVRA
expressly guarantees victims the right to “full and timely restitu-
tion.”47 DOJ personnel are required to use their best efforts to ensure
that crime victims receive notification of, and are accorded, this right
to restitution.48 However, the notification requirement is limited by a
further clause. In cases where there are multiple victims, or if the
number of victims “makes it impracticable” to afford them all their
rights, the court has discretion to make a “reasonable procedure to
give effect” to the CVRA “that does not unduly complicate or prolong
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Maglich, supra note 3.
47 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6).
48 Id. § 3771(c)(1).
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the proceedings.”49 These limitations are readily apparent in large
FCPA enforcements. Perhaps most damaging to FCPA victims, the
CVRA also explicitly states that a victim has no cause of action for
damages based on a violation of their CVRA rights.50 However, the
CVRA does allow victims to assert their victims’ rights through a mo-
tion for relief and a writ of mandamus.51
C. Victim and Witness Protection Act and Mandatory Victim
Restitution Act
Courts use restitution orders to compensate victims.52 How-
ever, these restitution orders are exceedingly rare,53 and have been
found in only a handful of cases.54 The statutory authority for ordering
criminal restitution comes from the Victim and Witness Protection
Act55 and the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act.56 The Victim and
Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”) empowers the court with the discre-
tion to order restitution in certain cases.57  Under the VWPA, a court
may issue a restitution order for any offense falling under Title 18 of
the U.S. Code.58 When ordering restitution, the court must balance the
loss of the victim, the defendant’s financial resources, and any other
factor that the court finds relevant.59 In that way, the VWPA reflects
“a focus on the penal goals of the State and the situation of the defen-
dant,” and not a focus “on the victim’s injury.”60 Additionally, the
“complexity exception” states that a court is not required to order resti-
tution if it finds that the process of determining a victim’s loss would
be too complicated or would prolong the sentencing process to such a
degree that it “outweighs the need to provide restitution to any
victims.”61
49 Id. § 3771(d)(2).
50 Id. § 3771(d)(6).
51 Id. § 3771(d)(3).
52 Maglich, supra note 3.
53 Id.
54 See U.S. v. Diaz, No. 09-cr-20346-JEM (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/diazj.html; U.S. v. F.G. Mason
Eng’g, No. B-90-29 (D. Conn. 1990), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/fg-mason.html; U.S. v. Kenny Int’l Corp., No. 79-372 (D. D.C.
1979), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kenny-inter
national.html.
55 18 U.S.C. § 3663.
56 Id. § 3663A.
57 Id. § 3663(a)(1)(A).
58 Id.
59 Id. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
60 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986).
61 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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Congress pursued slightly different objectives when it passed
the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”) in 1996.62  The
MVRA reflects “a more fundamental shift in the purpose of restitu-
tion,” as the “new restitution scheme is not merely a means of punish-
ment and rehabilitation, but an ‘attempt to provide those who suffer
the consequences of crime with some means of recouping the personal
and financial losses.’”63 This act, as the name implies, creates
mandatory restitution in most federal cases.64 While an FCPA viola-
tion is not explicitly among the qualifying mandatory offenses,65
mandatory restitution is still available if the plea agreement connects
the FCPA violation with what would have been a qualifying offense.66
Working in tandem with the VWPA,67 a court can also issue a restitu-
tion order agreed to in a plea agreement68 in any criminal case, includ-
ing an FCPA violation. In fact, a court can even provide restitution to
individuals who are not “victims” of the charged offense.69 Similar to
the VWPA, a “complexity exception” tempers this availability of resti-
tution under the MVRA.70 An additional similarity exists between the
MVRA and the VWPA in that restitution orders are nearly non-
existent.
The explanation for this dearth of restitution might be simpler
than it first appears. The FCPA is codified in Title 15 while the VWPA
and MVRA apply only to Title 18 offenses.71 However, FCPA prosecu-
tions usually include a conspiracy count,72 which would be a Title 18
62 Federal Crime Victims’ Rights & Services, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.just
ice.gov/usao/briefing_room/vw/about.html.
63 U.S. v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 530 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-16,
at 5 (1995)).
64 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62.
65 Qualifying offenses include crimes of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16, Title
18 property offenses, controlled substance manufacturing offenses, consumer
products tampering, sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, domestic
violence, telemarketing fraud, Child Support Recovery Act, and human traffick-
ing. See Catharine M. Goodwin, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, U.S.
COURTS ADMIN. OFFICE, http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Guidelines_
Educational_Materials/trainnew.pdf.
66 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(2).
67 Id. § 3663.
68 Id. § 3663(a)(3).
69 Id. § 3663A(a)(3). This apparent latitude could allow for creative victim com-
pensation as there are serious issues with qualifying individuals or entities as
“victims” under the statutory guidelines that will be discussed later.
70 Id. § 3663A(c)(3).
71 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).
72 Maglich, supra note 3 (“A typical FCPA prosecution includes a count of conspir-
acy to violate the FCPA.”).
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offense and would allow the kind of MVRA tie-in discussed above.73
Additionally, the DOJ has noted other Title 18 offenses tied with
FCPA enforcement actions such as violations of the Travel Act,74
money laundering, mail fraud, and wire fraud.75 Any of these offenses
would provide the court with the ability to order restitution through
the VWPA,76 though the power is purely discretionary.77 Given this
context, and the apparent frequency of Title 18 charges, the absence of
restitution orders remains puzzling. A simple explanation is that the
DOJ chooses not to pursue restitution in plea agreements as they
could under the statutes, but other explanations exist.78
A second and related explanation lies in the difficulty with
identifying victims in an FCPA bribery case. Certainly there are vic-
tims of FCPA violations79 and the DOJ itself has stated as much.80
The restitution statutes, the MVRA and VWPA, as well as the CVRA
share a substantially similar definition of “victim.”81 In short, for an
individual to be a victim they must be (1) directly and proximately
harmed as a result of (2) an offense for which restitution can be or-
dered.82 However, the MVRA and VWPA definitions carry extra lan-
guage that includes people harmed in the course of a “scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern” in its definition of victim so long as that
“scheme, conspiracy, or pattern” is part of the charged offense.83 Con-
gress added this language specifically to deal with situations where a
guilty plea results in dropped charges.84
These definitions are not without controversy, and the CVRA
definition became the focus of litigation in a joint DOJ and SEC en-
forcement action against Alcatel-Lucent. The case raises several issues
73 18 U.S.C. § 371.
74 Id. § 1952.
75 FCPA Guide, supra note 12, at 48-49.
76 18 U.S.C. § 3663.
77 Id. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (“The court . . . may order . . . restitution.”).
78 Id. § 3663(a)(3).
79 Koehler, supra note 10.
80 “Bribery is not a victimless crime.” California Company, Its Two Executives and
Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for Their
Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mex-
ico, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
May/11-crm-596.html [hereinafter California Company].
81 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e).
82 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e).
83 Id.
84 Under the older definition of victim, if the offense to which they were a victim
was dropped as part of the plea agreement, the victim would have no avenue to
recover as technically the crime they were a victim of was not pled to. U.S. v.
Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 50-51 (2010).
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around defining FCPA victims, and provides insight into why more
victims have not received restitution.
III. ALCATEL-LUCENT AND ICE
A. Introduction
From the 1990’s through the end of 2006, Alcatel-Lucent, a
global telecommunications equipment company, and its subsidiaries
repeatedly violated the FCPA.85 The violations occurred in several lo-
cations and notably through an Alcatel-Lucent subsidiary in Costa
Rica.86 In conjunction with the award of three contracts worth over
$300 million, Alcatel-Lucent wired over $18 million to two Costa Rican
consultants who dispersed roughly $9 million in bribes to Costa Rican
officials.87 Some of the bribed officials worked for a Costa Rican power
company named Instituto Costaricense de Electricidad (“ICE”).88 In
2010, Alcatel-Lucent made an announcement that the company and its
subsidiaries had reached a settlement agreement with the DOJ and
SEC for approximately $137.4 million.89 In May 2011, pursuant to the
previously discussed provision of the CVRA,90 ICE petitioned the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida to protect their
CVRA rights after the DOJ failed “to protect those rights.”91
In their petition, ICE argued that it had suffered massive
losses as a direct result of the disloyalty of its directors and employees
who had been bribed.92 ICE noted that it assisted in the prosecution of
the case and that the SEC had already denied an ICE “Fair Fund”
request without explanation.93 ICE further stated that the DOJ had
determined that it was not a victim due to a DOJ policy stating that
85 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation
(Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-
1481.html; California Company, supra note 80, at 1.
86 California Company, supra note 80, at 2.
87 Id.
88 FCPA Motion That May Alter Settlement Procedures, SEC ACTIONS (May 6,
2011), http://www.secactions.com/an-fcpa-motion-that-may-alter-settlement-pro
cedures/.
89 Mike Koehler, Is ICE a Victim? And an Open Question!, FCPA PROFESSOR (May
25, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/is-ice-a-victim-and-an-open-question.
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).
91 Petition for Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) and Objection to Plea
Agreements and Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, U.S. v. Alcatel-Lucent, No.
CR-20907-CR-COOKE (S.D. Fla. 2011) [hereinafter ICE Petition for Relief], avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/2011-05-02-
ICE-Petition-for-Relief.pdf.
92 Id. at 7.
93 Id. at 11.
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foreign governments were not victims.94 ICE relied on the language of
the MVRA’s definition of victim, which included conspiracy charges.95
Alcatel-Lucent, on the other hand, argued that the VWPA, not the
MVRA, applied.96 The District Court denied the petition, with the
Court finding that ICE was involved in the crimes and suggesting it
may have been a co-conspirator with Alcatel-Lucent.97 The District
Court further held that the MVRA complexity exception98 applied, so
the Court could decline to provide restitution regardless.99 ICE then
appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit in two related actions: a
petition for a writ of mandamus and an appeal of the denial of its peti-
tion for victim status.100
B. Writ of Mandamus
ICE filed a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit on June 15, 2011.101 Rejecting the District Court’s co-
conspirator determination, ICE argued that it had not been officially
charged as a co-conspirator102 and then turned to agency law for fur-
ther support. Relying on 9th and 2nd Circuit precedence, ICE argued
that its directors and employees were agents and the “[l]aw is clear
that agents who accept bribes . . . operate for their own benefit and to
the detriment of their principles.”103
ICE then turned to the language of the CVRA and noted that
the statutory language defining victims does not exclude co-conspira-
tors.104 Again arguing that it was a statutory “victim” under the
CVRA, ICE argued that it was eligible for mandatory restitution under
the MVRA for two reasons.105 First, ICE argued that “courts have uni-
versally applied the MVRA to the conspiracy offense” to which Alcatel-
Lucent pled guilty.106 Second, ICE argued that one of the qualifying
mandatory MVRA offenses, “offenses against property,” had been com-
94 Id. at 11, n.16.
95 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 17, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad v.
S.D. Fla. (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-13707G) [hereinafter ICE Writ of Mandamus],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/2011-06-
15-Writ-of-Mandamus.pdf.
96 Id. at 23.
97 Id. at 11-13.
98 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B).
99 ICE Writ of Mandamus, supra note 95, at 25.
100 In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 11-12708-G (11th Cir. 2011).
101 Ice Writ of Mandamus, supra note 95, at 1.
102 Id. at 22
103 Id. at 20.
104 Id. at 22.
105 Id. at 23.
106 Id. at 24.
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mitted because money is property and the theft of money/property sat-
isfied the MVRA guidelines.107 ICE also noted, arguendo, that
assuming Alcatel-Lucent was correct (that the VWPA and not the
MVRA applied), it would still be entitled to restitution as a victim of a
conspiracy charge.108 Finally, ICE argued that the District Court’s us-
age of the complexity exception was an error in light of the fact that
ICE had submitted a “concise Declaration of Victim Losses”109 which
conceivably removed any specter that restitution “would complicate or
prolong the sentencing process.”110Accordingly, ICE urged the Elev-
enth Circuit to overturn the ruling of the District Court.
On June 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit denied ICE’s petition for writ of mandamus in an order slightly
longer than two pages.111 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the District
Court did not err when it found ICE had been a co-conspirator.112 The
Court went further and agreed with the District Court’s determination
that ICE did not establish that it had been harmed, citing 9th Circuit
precedent that “[a]s a general rule, a participant in a crime cannot
recover restitution.”113
C. Petition for Victim Status
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed ICE’s petition for victim status
based on two issues. First, the court looked to ICE’s claim against the
deferred prosecution agreement entered into by Alcatel-Lucent it-
self.114 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case because a deferred prosecution agreement was not a final
judgment and, as such, there was no final judgment from which ICE
could appeal.115 Second, the Eleventh Circuit turned to ICE’s conten-
tion that its CVRA rights had been violated by the settlement agree-
ment between the government and certain Alcatel-Lucent
subsidiaries.116
The Eleventh Circuit again concluded that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction for several reasons.  The court looked to its own
107 ICE Writ of Mandamus, supra note 95, at 14.
108 Id. at 23.
109 Id. at 25.
110 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B).
111 In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 11-12707-G, 11-12708-G
(11th Cir. 2011), available at http://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/953/original/
In_re_Instituto.pdf?1317065417.
112 Id.
113 Id. (citing U.S. v. Lazarenko, 624 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2010)).
114 U.S. v. Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012).
115 Id. at 1304-05.
116 Id. at 1305.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\rgl304.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-JUL-13 8:50
2013] “ICE” CAPADES: RESTITUTION ORDERS AND THE FCPA 445
precedent, and the precedent of the First,117 Tenth,118 and D.C. Cir-
cuits,119 “that crime victims, as non-parties to the criminal action, lack
standing to appeal the defendant’s sentence.”120 The court went on to
note that, under the CVRA, a writ of mandamus “is a crime victim’s
sole avenue for appellate review”121 because the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), a CVRA predecessor statute, did not
create a private remedy for crime victims.122 As the court also denied
the writ of mandamus, this denial effectively ended ICE’s quest for
restitution.
D. Aftermath
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of both petitions, ICE
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.123  On December 10,
2012, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari.124
With this denial, the future for victim restitution in FCPA enforce-
ment remains cloudy.
As the ICE court held, a victim’s status as a non-party125 and
the express language of CVRA126 indicates that a writ of mandamus is
a non-party victim’s only avenue for redress under the CVRA, VWPA,
and MVRA if a victim is not given restitution by a district court. As the
Eleventh Circuit did not move past the issue of whether ICE qualified
as a victim, the Court left several questions unanswered. First, if ICE
was a victim, whether they would qualify under the MVRA because of
the conspiracy charge or under the alternate theory that Alcatel-Lu-
cent’s offenses qualified as “crimes against property.” Second, if ICE
would alternatively qualify for compensation under the VWPA. Third,
if the case would trigger the complexity clause, despite the “concise
declaration” ICE filed.127
117 U.S. v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2010).
118 U.S. v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008).
119 U.S. v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Though not noted by the Court,
the Third Circuit (U.S. v. Stoerr, 695 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2012)) and Fifth Circuit
(U.S. v. Slovacek, 699 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2012)) have also ruled that crime victims
lack jurisdiction or standing to appeal.
120 Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d at 1305 (11th Cir. 2012).
121 Id. at 1305-06.
122 Id. at 1305.
123 Brief for the Petitioner, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad v. U.S., 2012
WL 5492455 (2012).
124 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 806 (Dec. 10, 2012).
125 U.S. v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 52-53 (2010); Alcatel-Lucent France,
SA, 688 F.3d at 1304-6.
126 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).
127 ICE Writ of Mandamus, supra note 95, at 25.
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Unfortunately for ICE, it was arguing a bad set of facts.128 If
the DOJ’s assertions are correct, there was “profound and pervasive
corruption at the highest levels of ICE.”129 Even ICE acknowledged
that several members of its board of directors took bribes.130 So, even
if ICE was not a co-conspirator of Alcatel-Lucent, it certainly had some
dirt on its hands. This raises a larger issue that permeates throughout
anti-bribery efforts worldwide: who are the victims? The question
presents an immense gray area that others have discussed at length131
and is outside the scope of this comment. Regardless of where the line
is drawn, however, there are certainly individuals or groups that can
be called victims. So the question becomes if there are victims, and
those victims have a case with better facts than ICE, would the trium-
virate of the VWPA, CVRA, and MVRA provide restitution? Further, is
the current restitution legislation addressing the needs of FCPA vic-
tims in general? These unanswered questions raise a number of con-
cerns and their impact can only be truly understood in the context of a
real life example like the pending Wal-Mart case.
IV. WAL-MART
In December 2011, Wal-Mart disclosed that it had conducted
internal investigations concerning possible violations of the FCPA in
Mexico.132 While those investigations later expanded into Brazil, In-
dia, and China,133 the focus has remained in Mexico.134 The New York
128 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 52 (2012).
129 Government’s Response to ICE’s Petition for Victim Status and Restitution at
1, U.S. v. Alcatel-Lucent. No. 10-CR-20906-COOKE (S.D. Fla. 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcatel-etal/2011-05-23-Gov-Resp
onse-re-Victim.pdf.
130 ICE Petition for Relief, supra note 91, at 7.
131 See, e.g., Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861 (2010);
Alexandra Wrage, Paying the Fox to Buy New Chickens, HUFFINGTON POST (July
15, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandra-wrage/paying-the-fox-to-buy-
new_b_647837.html; Koehler, supra note 10; Maglich, supra note 3.
132 Richard L. Cassin, Walmart Joins Our Corporate Investigations List, FCPA
BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011, 3:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/12/walmart-
joins-our-corporate-investigations-list.html.
133 Richard L. Cassin, Report of Massive Bribery by Walmart in Mexico, FCPA
BLOG (Apr. 21, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/4/21/report-of-
massive-bribery-by-walmart-in-mexico.html; Richard L. Cassin, Wal-Mart’s Lob-
bying Triggers India Investigation, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 12, 2012, 5:25 AM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/12/12/wal-marts-lobbying-triggers-india-investiga
tion.html; Stephanie Clifford and David Barstow, Wal-Mart Inquiry Reflects
Alarm on Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
11/16/business/wal-mart-expands-foreign-bribery-investigation.html?pagewanted
=all; Congressmen: Documents Show Wal-Mart CEO and Execs Told About Mexico
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Times reported in April 2012 that the bribe payments in Mexico alone
totaled over $24 million.135 The former head of Wal-Mart Mexican sub-
sidiary Wal-Mart de Mexico’s real estate department told the New
York Times that the bribes “bought zoning approvals, reductions in en-
vironmental impact fees and the allegiance of neighborhood lead-
ers.”136 Further allegations state that Wal-Mart executives knew
about the bribery as early as 2005137 and attempted to cover up the
payments at their Bentonville, Arkansas headquarters.138 The head-
quarters cover up purportedly involved Wal-Mart’s top lawyer sending
the internal investigation files to the general counsel of Wal-Mart de
Mexico who supposedly authorized the bribes.139
One part of the story that has attracted particular media atten-
tion involves Wal-Mart opening a store near the UNESCO World Heri-
tage Pre-Hispanic City of Teotihuacan.140 According to reports, bribes
were paid to the Municipal Council and the Director of the National
Institute of Anthropology and History to clear the way for a Wal-Mart
store to be built near the ancient pyramids.141 In exchange for the
bribes, a zoning map was changed to allow the new store to be built.142
Residents objected to the move and protested for months to no avail.143
In the end, Wal-Mart paid over $200,000 in bribes and built its newest
Bribe Allegations in 2005, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 10, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://www.fcpa
blog.com/blog/2013/1/10/congressmen-documents-show-wal-mart-ceo-and-execs-
told-about.html [hereinafter Congressmen].
134 David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-
Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?_r=
2&.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Congressmen, supra note 133.
138 Barstow, supra note 134.
139 Id.
140 Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform & Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy & Com-
merce, to Michael T. Duke, C.E.O., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in Congressmen, supra
note 133 [hereinafter Cummings Letter]; Maria Dolores Hernandez J., Fallout in
Mexico From Walmart Allegations, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 21, 2013, at 1:23 AM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/1/21/fallout-in-mexico-from-walmart-allegations.
html; Pre-Hispanic City of Teotihuacan, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/
414 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
141 Cummings Letter, supra note 140; Hernandez, supra note 140.
142 David Barstow & Alejanda Xanic von Bertrab, The Bribery Aisle: How Wal-
Mart Got Its Way in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/18/business/walmart-bribes-teotihuacan.html?_r=0.
143 Id.
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store “in the shadow of a revered national treasure,” the pyramids of
Teotihuacan.144
The ongoing Wal-Mart investigation provides a perfect exam-
ple of the difficulties surrounding restitution in FCPA litigation. If the
allegations made by the New York Times are true, and the DOJ’s as-
sertion that bribery is not a victimless crime145 is correct, who should
obtain restitution? Perhaps the question is best answered by starting
with assessing what damage has been done. According to the New
York Times, the new Wal-Mart in Teotihuacan has caused numerous
issues, the most serious of which include: the destruction of ancient
artifacts, increased traffic congestion, lost revenue to local businesses,
and the intangible harm to Mexican culture and heritage.146 The list of
potential victims for these harms would include numerous individuals,
from the citizens of Teotihuacan up to the Mexican government itself.
Analyzing these entities’ claims under current precedent, it seems un-
likely that the restitution statutes would provide compensation.
The first hurdle that the potential victims would need to pass
is completely out of their control. Pursuant to VWPA and MVRA re-
quirements, Wal-Mart would need to be found guilty or plead guilty to
a Title 18 offense.147 Next, the potential victims would need to qualify
under the statutory definition of “victim.” The statutes share a com-
mon definition of “victim” and, in essence, require a showing that an
individual or entity has been directly or proximately harmed as a re-
sult of a federal offense.148 To some degree, the potential victim’s abil-
ity to qualify would depend on what Wal-Mart actually was found
guilty of, plead guilty to, or what charges are included in a deferred-
prosecution or non-prosecution agreement. However, the statutory
language extends “victims” to include those harmed by the “scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern.”149 Accordingly, so long as the damage is tied to
Wal-Mart’s alleged scheme,150 they should qualify. If the Mexican gov-
ernment seeks restitution, the same issues that arose for ICE may ap-
pear again. ICE attempted to claim that its own employees victimized
the organization and, in many ways, Mexico would be making the
144 Id.
145 California Company, supra note 80.
146 Barstow & von Bertrab, supra note 142.
147 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c).
148 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(2)(D); 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).
149 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e).
150 “Under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2), any conduct that is in the course of the scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern may be considered in calculating restitution. Thus, if this
case involved a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, the district
court could properly include the suppressed evidence in the restitution order re-
gardless of whether it was conduct of conviction.” U.S. v. Acosta, 303 F.3d 78, 87
(1st Cir. 2002).
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same argument. Through the corruption of its own civil servants, the
Mexican government provided Wal-Mart with the necessary building
permits. In that light, a court may well view them as something akin
to a co-conspirator as the Eleventh Circuit did with ICE. Precedent,
however, may help Mexico in this instance.
In two of the rare instances where a court ordered restitution
in FCPA cases, U.S. v. F.G. Mason Engineering, Inc. and U.S. v. Juan
Diaz, the respective governments were able to obtain restitution for
the losses they suffered as a result of their officials being bribed. In
Mason, a manufacturer bribed a West German intelligence official in
order to obtain business from the West German government.151 The
District Court ordered restitution to the West German government in
the amount of $160,000.152 In Diaz, an individual was ordered to pay
$73,824.20 in restitution to the Haitian government following the dis-
covery of a telephone rate conspiracy.153
What makes the Wal-Mart case more difficult than Mason or
Diaz is the computation of damages. Even if a court did accept the
notion that individual citizens or the government of Mexico were “vic-
tims” under the statute, it is unlikely that they would obtain restitu-
tion. The previously mentioned “complexity exception” will likely be
triggered and would allow a court to avoid ordering restitution if it
finds that the process of determining a victim’s loss would be too com-
plicated.154 While the Mason court could use easily calculable sums of
money that the company overcharged the West German government
on contracts, and the Diaz court could use easily calculable sums of
lost revenue from telephone rate charges, the damage caused by Wal-
Mart is far more complicated and speculative.
If a private Mexican citizen or group of citizens were to assert
the destroyed relics as their statutory damages, a court would face the
task of calculating the value of ancient pottery, altars, plazas, graves,
an 800-year-old wall, and other items that in many ways are price-
less.155 Similarly, local business owners may assert future business
losses, but courts typically consider these types of claims too specula-
151 U.S. v. F.G. Mason Eng’g, Inc., Case No. B-90-29(JAC) (D. Conn. 1990), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/fg-mason.html.
152 Plea Agreement at 3, U.S. v. F.G. Mason Eng’g, Inc., No. B-90-29-JAC (D.
Conn. 1990), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/fg-ma
son/1990-06-25-fg-mason-plea-agreement-(fg-mason).pdf.
153 U.S. v. Diaz, No. 1:09-20346-CR-MARTINEZ-1 (S.D. Fla. 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/diazj/2012-05-23-diazj-amended-
judgment.pdf; Maglich, supra note 3.
154 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).
155 Barstow & von Bertrab, supra note 142.
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tive.156 Further allegations of cultural harm would be even more spec-
ulative.157 Further complicating the Mexican government’s claims are
the nature and details of the alleged offenses. Unlike the governments
in Mason and Diaz, where single government employees intentionally
deprived their governments of money, the myriad of Mexican officials
involved in the Wal-Mart bribery scheme158 makes the case far more
analogous to ICE and thus unlikely to end in an award of restitution to
the government. Given the multitude of issues facing the potential vic-
tims, it appears unlikely that any money from the Wal-Mart case will
see its ways back to the victims through the restitution statutes.
V. OTHER AVENUES OF RECOVERY
While the restitution statutes are clearly an underutilized and
seemingly inadequate means of recovery for FCPA victims, there are
other avenues of potential recovery. For example, while the lack of a
Title 15 restitution statute may prevent some FCPA victims from gain-
ing restitution, another option is available under the Title 18 Condi-
tions of Probation.159 The Federal District Court of Utah noted in U.S.
v. Wenger that the lack of a Title 15 restitution statute akin to the
VWPA in Title 18 “appears to be a statutory ‘glitch.’”160 The court de-
cried this lack of statutory authority to provide restitution as nonsen-
156 There is little precedent on the interpretation of the restitution statutes in
FCPA cases. Turning to courts’ interpretations of the statutes in other contexts,
the preeminent case, U.S. v. Fountain, held that “projecting lost future earnings
has no place in criminal sentencing if the amount or present value of those earn-
ings is in dispute.” U.S. v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 802 opinion supplemented on
denial of reh’g, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985). Fountain was interpreting the VWPA
and the Ninth Circuit held that it was not directly applicable under the MVRA.
U.S. v. Cienfuegoes, 462 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit
interpreted the MVRA such that the complexity exception did not apply in the
category of violent cases, but it did apply under the remaining MVRA categories.
Id. The Eighth Circuit substantially agreed with the Fountain decision, but held
that future claims were not categorically barred in MVRA cases as they are in
VWPA cases. U.S. v. Oslund, 453 F.3d 1048, 1063 (8th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Cir-
cuit and Tenth Circuit have also largely agreed with the Fountain holding. U.S. v.
Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 824 (5th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1120
(10th Cir. 2007). As FCPA cases fall under the non-violent categories of the MVRA
(if they fall under the statute at all) or more properly fall under the VWPA, the
Fountain precedent is most applicable.
157 Again, the lack of precedent makes finding analogous situations difficult. One
case that may be instructive is U.S. v. Bengimina, where the Court found the valu-
ation of restitution for a loss of corporate “good will” too complicated under the
VWPA. 699 F.Supp. 214, 219 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
158 Barstow & von Bertrab, supra note 142.
159 18 U.S.C. § 3563.
160 United States v. Wenger, 2004 WL 724458, at *6 (D. Utah  Jan. 30, 2004).
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sical.161 However, the court did note an interesting way around their
lack of Title 15 authority. While declining to follow such an option, the
Court noted that it nonetheless had the authority to order restitution
for a Title 15 offense as a condition of supervised release.162 This au-
thority is admittedly limited,163 but does provide an interesting
method to grant restitution for crime victims where the defendant is
put on supervised release.
Another possible avenue of recovery lies in civil litigation.
There is no express private right of action under the FCPA, but victims
have tried collateral civil litigation.164 These efforts have included fil-
ing shareholder derivative, securities fraud, RICO, tortious interfer-
ence, and unfair competition actions.165 While some limited success
has been found through collateral civil litigation, it too has proved to
be a largely ineffective means of gaining restitution.166
The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project
(“SERAP”), a Nigerian NGO, has put forth a very interesting solution
to the problem.167 In March 2012, SERAP sent a letter to the SEC
outlining a plan for broader victim compensation.168 Under SERAP’s
plan, a victim foreign government or an NGO involved in that foreign
state would have 60 days after the end of an FCPA enforcement action
to file a claim for part or all of the settlement proceeds.169 The U.S.
Government would then have 60 days to act on the request and issue a
statement explaining its decision.170 The plan would require the for-
eign government or NGO to show that they have sufficient safeguards
in place to protect against further misuse of the funds.171 In this way,
the claims of various foreign governments and other victims could be
161 Id.
162 “At most, the court has limited authority, as a condition of supervised release
following any prison term, to order restitution to victims.” Id.
163 “This limited authority to impose restitution makes no sense. In cases such as
this one where victims have suffered significant losses as a direct and proximate
result of the defendant’s securities fraud, the court believes it should have the
authority to impose full and immediate restitution.” Id.
164 Mark, supra note 10, at 420, 486.
165 Id. at 420.
166 Id. at 486.
167 Alexander W. Sierck, African NGO Asks for Distribution of FCPA Recoveries,
FCPA BLOG (Mar. 16, 2012, 3:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/3/16/afri
can-ngo-asks-for-distribution-of-fcpa-recoveries.html.
168 Benjamin Kessler, Giving Back to the Victims, FCPA BLOG (May 2, 2012, 1:53
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/5/2/giving-back-to-the-victims.html.
169 Letter from Alexander W. Sierck, Volunteer, SERAP, to Robert S. Khuzami,
Dir., Enforcement Div., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 4 (2012), available at http://
www.mediafire.com/?kkg0xg8bmwjy4aa.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 5.
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evaluated on a case-by-case basis, outside of the court system, to deter-
mine the best use of the funds obtained through FCPA enforcement.172
The SEC responded to SERAP’s request by thanking them for the let-
ter and stating that they would take the idea under consideration.173
That consideration has ultimately led to no new policies by the SEC or
DOJ in regards to victim compensation. However, the idea put forth by
SERAP is a step in the right direction.
The type of plan called for by SERAP would alleviate many of
the thorny problems around FCPA victim compensation. The thought
of giving money back to the very governments who have been cor-
rupted feels like “paying the fox to buy new chickens.”174 Under the
SERAP plan, however, a foreign government would be required to
show that they have taken steps to address their bribery issues before
they would see a dime. Even if a government is unwilling or unable to
change, the possibility that an NGO could distribute the money makes
for a far better solution. Providing funds to an NGO after an FCPA
violation is not unprecedented175 and would alleviate the needs of fur-
ther U.S. involvement while ensuring that at least some of the money
is put to good use.
Unfortunately FCPA enforcement often brings about situations
that have the feel of choosing the lesser of two evils. However, this
difficulty should not lead to what it currently does: a bar to victim res-
titution. What the very real victims of FCPA violations need is new
legislation or new DOJ policies that take into account the large gray
area frequently found in FCPA enforcement. Whatever the final form
of reform, some change must occur. The ICE case did not present ideal
facts but that should not halt further reform efforts. As one commenta-
tor put it: “I am not sure where criminal fines should go when a French
company bribes Costa Rican ‘foreign officials,’ but I am pretty sure
that the answer should not be 100% to the U.S. Treasury.”176
172 Id. at 1.
173 Kessler, supra note 168.
174 Wrage, supra note 131.
175 In 2007, following an FCPA violation in Kazakhstan, an agreement was
reached by the United States, Switzerland, and Kazakhstan whereby money from
the violation was given to an NGO in Kazakhstan for the benefit of underprivi-
leged Kazakh children. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW YORK MERCHANT BANK
PLEADS GUILTY TO FCPA VIOLATION; BANK CHAIRMAN PLEADS GUILTY TO FAILING
TO DISCLOSE CONTROL OF FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNT (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-crm-909.html.
176 Koehler, supra note 89.
